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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ANNA MARIE MORGAN, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) CP No: 990377 
I Priority No: 2 
OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (Supp. 1998), and pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) 
(1998) . 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion 
to Dismiss the Bindover Order. 
1. Standard of Review 
The standard of review is for correctness. State v. 
Rameriz, 812 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
B. Whether the Appellant/Defendant's ("Defendant") Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. 
1. Standard of Review 
When a "claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is raised for 
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it 
presents a question of law." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 
(Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 
(Utah App. 1992)). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. U.S. Const., Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. Utah Const., Art. I § 7, Art. I § 12, and Art. I § 13. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
After trial by jury in the Third District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Murray Department, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., presiding, the Defendant was found guilty 
of Distributing, Offering or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1998). The Defendant was also found 
guilty of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998) . This appeal follows. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 2nd, 1998, a preliminary hearing ("Hearing") was held 
before the Honorable Michael Burton ("Judge Burton") under Case 
no: 981200247FS. After receiving evidence and hearing testimony, 
Judge Burton determined there was insufficient evidence to bind 
the Defendant over on Count I, Distributing, Offering or 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) 
(Supp. 1998). See Preliminary Hearing ("Pre. Lim. I"), dated May 
6th, 1988 at 34, lines 22-25 and page 35, lines 1-2. Judge 
Burton did, however, find sufficient evidence to bind the 
Defendant over on the lesser charge of unlawful possession of a 
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controlled substance. Id. Judge Burton also took under 
advisement the State's oral motion to reopen the evidence. Id. 
at 40, lines 10-14. 
At a later hearing held before Judge Burton, on June 3rd, 
1998, based upon the State's oral Motion to Dismiss, Judge Burton 
dismissed the charges against the Defendant. See Hearing on 
State's Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing, dated June 3rd, 
1998 at 40, lines 15-20. The State then refiled identical 
charges against the Defendant. 
On July 29th, 1998, a second preliminary hearing was held 
before Judge Burton under Case no: 981201030FS. The Defendant 
was bound over on Count I, Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1998) . See Preliminary Hearing 
("Pre. Lim. II"), dated July 29th, 1998 at 30, line 20-24. The 
Defendant was also bound over on Count II, Illegal Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998) . 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant asserts the prosecutor should not have been 
permitted to dismiss and then refile a charge against her that 
had been dismissed at a preliminary hearing due to insufficient 
evidence unless new or previously unavailable evidence was 
introduced. In the instant case, no new or previously 
unavailable evidence was introduced at the second preliminary 
hearing and, therefore, the trial court should have quashed the 
3 
bindover order. When the bindover order was not quashed, 
Defendant's due process rights under the Utah Constitution were 
violated. 
The Defendant also maintains that her Sixth Amendment right 
to effective counsel was violated. This is because counsel 
failed to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's 
dismissal of her Motion to Dismiss the Bindover order. This 
deficient performance by trial counsel prejudiced the Defendant 
because the State could have only sought prosecution of the 
Defendant on a third degree felony charge, rather than the second 
degree felony charge she was charged and convicted of. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE BINDOVER ORDER 
"In order to establish a factual and legal basis for binding 
[a] defendant over for trial at a preliminary hearing, the State 
must introduce 'sufficient evidence to persuade the magistrate 
that there is "probable cause to believe that the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it [.]"' " 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986) (quoting Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984) (quoting 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(d)(1))). The State failed in its burden. 
This is because Judge Burton determined there was insufficient 
evidence to bind the Defendant over on Count I. See Pre. Lim. I 
at 34, lines 22-23 and 35, lines 1-2. 
Having failed in its burden to persuade Judge Burton there 
exists probable cause to bind the Defendant over on Count I, the 
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State, in open court, requested that Judge Burton dismiss the 
charges against the Defendant. See Hearing on State's Motion to 
Reopen Preliminary Hearing, dated June 3rd, 1998 at 40, lines 15-
20. The charges were dismissed. Id. Subsequently, the State 
refiled identical charges against the Defendant. This refiling, 
the Defendant asserts, violated her due process rights guaranteed 
her under Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution. See e.g.. State 
v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 645 (Utah 1986). 
In Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach set 
forth by the Oklahoma courts as to when a prosecutor may refile 
charges. Presently, the general rule in Utah is that "due 
process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling 
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence 
unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies 
refiling." 714 P.2d at 647 (citing Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169, 
171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971 (1971)). 
The facts and procedural path of Brickey follow. In 
Brickey, at the first preliminary hearing, the victim testified 
that Brickey had moved his hand along her leg to her genital area 
and touched her breast, and when the victim said don't, he 
stopped, and instead tried to kiss her. Id. at 645. "No other 
evidence was presented at the initial preliminary hearing." Id. 
Brickey's counsel moved for dismissal, "arguing that because the 
State did not establish that Brickey had acted without the 
victim's consent, it had failed to establish a prima facia case 
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of forcible sexual abuse." Id. The trial court agreed and 
dismissed the charges. Id. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor refiled the charge, and another 
"preliminary hearing was held before a second magistrate." Id. 
At this hearing, the victim again testified, essentially 
testifying to the same facts as she did at the first hearing. 
Id. This time, however, her father, who was also present at the 
first hearing, took the stand and testified that "when 
confronted, Brickey admitted 'making advances' toward the victim 
and touching the victim and touching her genital area and 
breasts." Id. 
At the close of the State's evidence, Brickey's counsel 
"again moved to dismiss, asserting that the State's failure to 
introduce new evidence relating to the consent issue was fatal to 
the information." Id. The prosecutor responded by arguing "that 
the father's testimony constituted 'new evidence' and buttressed 
the case sufficiently to require that it be bound over." Id. at 
645-66. The trial court agreed and Brickey was bound over. Id. 
at 646. The Brickey Court, however, disagreed and determined 
that "no new or previously unavailable evidence relating to the 
issue of consent was introduced." Id. at 648. And, therefore, 
"[u] nder th[o] se circumstances, there was no good cause for 
refiling the charge against Brickey, and the district court 
should have quashed the bindover." See id. 
The foregoing is the same procedural pattern we have in the 
instant matter. During the first preliminary hearing, Officer 
6 
Eric Lindquist ("Officer Lindquist") from the Murray Police 
Department testified with respect to the amount of illegal drugs 
alleged to be attributable to the Defendant. See Pre. Lim. I at 
9-12. Based upon this alleged amount, the prosecutor asked 
Officer Lindquist whether, "based upon [his] training and [his] 
experience, [he had] an opinion as to why [the Defendant] would 
possess these substances in these quantities?" Pre. Lim. I at 
15, lines 21-24. Officer Lindquist said that in his opinion, 
"due to the amount and the bag found underneath the seat and the 
other plastic baggies, that that substance would probably be 
separated into smaller bags and sold for profit." Id. at 16, 
lines 1-4. Judge Burton did not agree, and found insufficient 
evidence to bind the Defendant over on Count I. See Pre. Lim. I 
at 34, lines 22-25 and page 35, lines 1-2. The State later moved 
to dismiss the charges against the Defendant, and then refiled 
identical charges. 
At the second preliminary hearing, Officer Lindquist again 
testified. See Pre. Lim. II at 3-17. His testimony again 
focused on the amount allegedly attributed to the Defendant. Id. 
In addition to Officer Lindquist's testimony, the State called 
Detective Scott Hansen ("Detective Hansen") from the Murray City 
Police Department to testify. Id. at 18-26. Detective Hansen 
was available at the first hearing, however, the State elected 
not to call him. See Pre. Lim. I at 38, line 1 ("I do have 
Officer Hansen."). In any event, during this hearing, Detective 
Hansen was asked "why someone would possess" that amount. Id. at 
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23, lines 13-14, Detective Hansen responded by saying the amount 
alleged to attributed to the Defendant is generally "not 
consistent with just individual or personal use." Id. at 24, 
line 1. 
The Defendant maintains that at the second hearing, no new 
or previously unavailable evidence was introduced. This is 
because all opinions offered as to why a person would possess 
that quantity were based upon the same toxicology report 
introduce at the first hearing. Thus, no new evidence was 
introduced. Moreover, no previously unavailable evidence was 
introduced. This is because, again, the toxicology report was 
the same report used in both hearings. 
Additionally, Detective Hansen's testimony does not 
constitute new or previously unavailable evidence. The only 
reason Detective Hansen's testimony was introduced was to 
buttress Officer Lindquist's testimony. Detective Hansen's 
testimony is akin to the victim's father's testimony in Brickey, 
that is, offered to buttress the victim's testimony. However, as 
the Brickey Court noted, that does not constitute new evidence or 
good cause." See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 648 ("[N]o new or 
previously unavailable evidence relating to the issue of consent 
was introduced."). In other words, it is not enough for the 
prosecutor to put on second witness at a second preliminary 
hearing, and then have that witness testify about what the first 
witness testified to, especially when that testimony was 
previously available. See State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 865 (Utah 
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App. 1998) ("We agree with the magistrate that the facts 
presented in Dr. Walker's opinion testimony could have been 
discovered before the 1995 preliminary hearing in the exercise 
diligence, and in that sense Dr. Walker's testimony is not 'new 
evidence.'"). Thus, "[u]nder these circumstances [of this case], 
there was no good cause for refiling the charges against [the 
Defendant], and the district court should have quashed the 
bindover." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 648. 
13. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANT OF COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED 
The Defendant asserts her Sixth Amendment rights were 
violated because, following the trial court's denial of her 
Motion to Dismiss the Bindover Order, trial counsel should have 
sought interlocutory review of that decision. 
"The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right 
to assistance of counsel in all criminal proceedings." Houchin 
v. Zavaris, 107 F.3d 1465, 1471 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. 
Const, amend VI). " [T]his right to assistance of counsel 
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel." Id. 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). 
"'The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.'" State v. Holland, 
876 P.2 357, 362 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
686). "In considering claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Utah courts have consistently applied the test 
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articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 
[sic]." State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993) 
(internal quotations omitted; citations omitted). See State v. 
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) ("In determining whether 
[sic] counsel was constitutionally ineffective, we apply the two-
prong test established in Strickland [sic]."). 
"'In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, [the Defendant] must show that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness," and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
88) (citing State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) 
and State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993))). 
"When a defendant claims that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, [appellate courts] must 'indulge in the strong 
presumption counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."'" 
Garrett, 849 P.2d at 579 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) 
(quoting Michel v. Louisana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
"To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland 
test, 'a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."'" Arguelles, 921 
10 
P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. (1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694)). "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict." State v. Alvarado, 845 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
1. Deficient performance 
Defendant contends that subsequent to the denial of her 
Motion to Quash the Bindover Order, trial counsel should have 
sought interlocutory review of that denial. Because counsel did 
not, counsel's performance was deficient inasmuch as it fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Deficient because 
the procedural pattern in Defendant's case are parallel to those 
in Brickev wherein the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial 
court's bindover order. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 644-48. 
2. Whether the Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's 
deficient performance 
The Defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel deficient 
performance because had interlocutory review been sought, and 
given that the facts of her case parallel those in Brickey, 
requiring a quashal of a bindover order, the State could only 
have sought prosecution on the charge of Illegal Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, rather than the more 
serious charge of Distributing, Offering or Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony. 
Because the Defendant has satisfied both prongs of the Strickland 
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test, this Court should find that the Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistant of counsel was violated. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should quash the 
Bindover Order, and this Court should also find that the 
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